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of the Ultra Vires Doctrine
I. INTRODUCTION
The voluminous increase in corporate mergers and acquisitions over the past
decade' has initiated the development and adoption of numerous antitakeover
devices. 2 One popular defensive device is the "poison pill," 3 which can effectively
fend off a takeover attempt by diluting the equity and voting power of an outside
acquirer. 4 Being a contentious shield against takeover,5 the number of poison pills
adopted by American corporations predictably jumped from four in 1983, its
introductory year, 6 to over 500 in 1988. 7
The poison pill met, and overcame, its first legal challenge in Moran v.
Household International, Inc.8 There, it was held that the decision of the target
corporation's directors to adopt a poison pill was both legislatively authorized and
protected by the business judgment rule. 9 While it is generally recognized that the
1. Matheson & Norberg, Hostile Share Acquisitions and Corporate Governance: A Framework for Evaluating
Antitakeover Activities, 47 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 407, 411-12 (1986) (discussing takeover activity from 1975 to 1985); Clark
& Malabre, Takeover Trend Helps Push Corporate Debt and Defaults Upward, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 6
(takeover activity continues into 1988).
2. The list of antitakeover devices includes: alteration of voting rights to minimize an acquirer's voting power,
payment of "greenmail," self-liquidation, Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 28-33 (1987); the "Pac-Man defense," "lock-up" arrangements, Note, Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS
Corp.: Posner's Plan for Poison Pills, 84 Wis. L. REv. 711, 711 n.2 (1987); dual class recapitalizations, Note, Dual Class
Recapitalization and Shareholder Voting Rights, 87 CoLum. L. Rev. 106 (1987); making an acquisition that will have
antitrust implications for the potential acquirer, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980),
aff'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); stock repurchase programs, Bradley & Rosenzweig,
Defensive Stock Repurchases and the Appraisal Remedy, 96 YALE L.J. 322 (1986), Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover
Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295, 301-11 (1986); merger with a "white knight," Block
& Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, I 1 SEc. REG. L.J. 44, 53-54
(1983); "scorched earth," Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1256-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); the
"poison put," Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987), and classified boards and fair price
amendments.
3. Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1964, 1964 n.2 (1984). Poison pills are variously referred to in technico as shareholder redemption
privileges or plans, S.M. LORNE, 11 AcQuismoNs AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND Co.rESED TRaNSActnoNS § 4.05(1)
(1986); shareholder rights agreements or plans, Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986);
preferred share purchase rights plans, Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985); or warrant
dividend plans, Ganek, Five Decisions That Shook the World ofM & A, 1986 Amt. LAw 9, 10 (April, 1986).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 33-42.
5. SEC, Office of the Chief Economist, A Study on the Economics of Poison Pills, [1985-86 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,971 (Mar. 5, 1986) [hereinafter SEC].
6. Id.
7. Lee, 'Poison Pills' Benefit Shareholders by Forcing Raiders to Pay More for Targets, Study Says, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 31, 1988, at 49, col. 4.
8. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
9. Id. at 1357.
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business judgment rule' 0 is an ineffectual overseer of directorial decisionmaking,"
the ultra vires challenge may prove to be a vital constraint on the adoption of poison
pills. For instance, in Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries, Inc.,12 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that New Jersey law
does not authorize a corporation to adopt a poison pill which discriminates among
shareholders in the same class of stock. 13 Significantly, the court's holding was
based on the theretofore dormant ultra vires doctrine.
This Comment examines the rule of Amalgamated Sugar in light of the
intricacies of the poison pill and the historical development and applications of the
ultra vires doctrine. It is argued that the ultra vires doctrine should act to void
corporate acts where a potential conflict of interest is created between corporate
managers and shareholders, and where the corporate act has not been specifically
authorized by the state legislature.
II. THE POISON PILL DEFINED
Generally, poison pills consist of packages of securities or options to buy that are
issued to shareholders as dividends and contain special redemption and conversion
rights. 14 More specifically, there are four types of poison pills that have been upheld
by courts: 1) the "antique" pill; 2) the "flip-over" pill; 3) the "back-end" pill; and
4) the "flip-in" pill.' 5
The antique variety was first developed in 1983 and is the progenitor of the
flip-over, back-end, and flip-in pills. 16 It was the first pill 'to be upheld by a court,' 7
and is the least potent of the four types. 18 Indeed, three of the four companies that
first adopted antique pills were subsequently taken over. 19 Moreover, the Securities
10. The business judgment rule is a judicial presumption that corporate directors discharged their duties of care and
loyalty in reaching a particular decision. Johnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors,
136 U. PA. L. REv. 315, 323-24 (1987). In the context of a board's adoption of an antitakeover device, the presumption
can be rebutted by showing that: 1) the directors acted in bad faith or without reasonable investigation; 2) there was no
reasonable basis for the decision; or 3) the decision reached was unreasonable in relation to the threat posed. Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985), cited vith approval in Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp.,
805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986). The rule is designed to prevent directors "from adopting [defensive] measures with the
principal purpose of entrenching existing management," Dawson, Pearce & Stone, Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42
Bus. LAw. 423, 424 (1987) [hereinafter Dawson].
11. See, e.g., Johnson & Seigel, supra note 10, at 328; Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses
and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 117, 117-18 (1986).
12. 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
13. Importantly, not all poison pills discriminate among shareholders in the same class of stock. See infra text
accompanying notes 16-26.
14. See, e.g.,Dawson, supra note 10, at 423; Note, supra note 3, at 1964.
15. SEC, supra note 5, at 88,044-45.
16. Id. Martin Lipton, of the New York-based law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, developed the antique
pill. Ganek, supra note 3, at 10. These pills are also referred to as "convertible preferred stock provision" type pills.
Dawson, supra note 10, at 429-30.
17. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Lenox, Inc., No. 83-2116 (D.N.J. June 20, 1983) (temporary
restraining order denied thereby validating the first poison pill); National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278
(Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983) (validating the poison pill).
18. SEC, supra note 5, at 88,044.
19. Ganek, supra note 3, at 10.
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and Exchange Commission reported that, since 1983, no corporation has adopted an
antique pill.20
The antique pill acts much like a fair price amendment by forcing an acquirer to
pay a minimum price for shares held by the shareholders remaining after an
acquisition has been consummated. 2 ' The pill is put into effect through the issuance
to shareholders of a dividend of preferred stock that is convertible into common
stock. 22 If the acquirer gains a certain percentage of the target's common stock-
usually forty percent-preferred holders can redeem the preferred at a price equal to
the highest price paid by the acquirer for the common stock during the preceding
year.23 Likewise, in the event of a merger, preferred holders can convert the preferred
into shares of the acquirer at a predetermined fair price.2 4
The antique pill only guarantees that holders of the target's common stock will
receive a fair price for their shares in the event of a takeover. It does not penalize an
acquirer by diluting the acquirer's voting power and equity in the target. Conse-
quently, the antique pill deters coercive two-tiered tender offers,25 but does not
adequately thwart open market purchases of targets.26
A more restrictive pill is the flip-over rights plan that was upheld in Moran.2 7 To
implement these pills, dividends consisting of the right to purchase shares in the
target are issued to shareholders of the target. 28 Initially, the rights have little value;
they may, for example, be "exercisable to purchase one one-hundredth share of new
preferred stock for $100.00 and... [also be] redeemable.., for $.50 per [rnight." 29
However, upon the occurrence of a "triggering event," the devastating conversion
rights vest.30 Triggering events include the announcement of a tender offer for a
substantial percentage of the target's shares or an outsider's acquisition of a specified
percentage of the company's shares. 3'
The conversion rights, once triggered, entitle the holder to purchase a fixed
dollar value of the common stock of the acquirer at a fifty percent discount in the
event of a second trigger-a merger, consolidation, or sale of substantial assets of the
target. 32 The target shareholders' bonanza "has the effect of substantially diluting the
equity of the [acquirer]'s existing stockholdings, thereby giving flip-over provisions





25. In a two-tiered tender offer, the acquirer "makes a cash tender offer for a controlling interest in the target and,
upon obtaining control, merges the target into itself at a lower second-tier price and usually in exchange for securities."
Lipton, supra note 2, at 18.
26. SEC, supra note 5, at 88,044.
27. Moran, 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985).
28. Dawson, supra note 10, at 426.
29. Moran, 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985). The redemption provision allows the target to disengage the poison
pill if the target decides to pursue a negotiated transaction. See Fleiseher & Golden, Poison Pill, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24,
1986, at 26, col. 2.
30. Moran, 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1349. Prior to the second trigger, the rights are exercisable at a price that bears no relationship to the
issuer's value. "Exercise of the rights generally becomes economic only in the event of" the second triggering event.
Dawson, supra note 10, at 427.
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their significant deterrent effect.' 33 However, an acquirer can wholly circumvent the
flip-over pill by purchasing a controlling share of the target's shares on the open
market. 34 As a result, the flip-over pill is only effective in deterring a formal
two-tiered takeover attempt. 35
Some companies pair a flip-over plan with another pill provision to strengthen
their defensive posture. The flip-in pill provides the added protection. Like the
flip-over pill, the flip-in pill contains redemption rights with a nominal value.36
However, upon the occurrence of the appropriate triggering event (for example, when
a twenty percent shareholder acquires more than thirty percent of the target's
common), the flip-in provision entitles "all right's holders, except the acquiring
person, . . . to purchase $100 worth of [the target's own shares] for $50, and the
acquiring person's rights become void." 37 It is this dilutive effect, discriminatorily
levelled only at the acquirer's holding, that deters the open market takeovers which
would succeed against a flip-over pill. 38
The final type of pill is the back-end pill.39 This pill is similar to a flip-in, but
uses an automatic self-tender rather than an automatic new issue of stock to dilute an
acquirer's holdings. 40 Accordingly, the back-end plan renders the proxy mechanism
less useful and restricts open market purchases for voting control. 4 1 Because of their
dilutive effect on open market purchases, the flip-in and back-end pills are the most
forceful takeover deterrents. 42
In sum, the poison pill derives its colorful name from the fact that once it is
"swallowed" pursuant to a triggering event, the resulting dilution of the acquirer's
holdings effectively "poisons" the takeover attempt. The potency of the pill depends
on the type, ranging from the mild antique pill to the lethal flip-in and back-end pills.
It is these later, deadlier models that test the outer limits of corporate authority.43
III. THE RULE OF AMALGAMATED SUGAR
In Amalgamated Sugar, the tender offeror, Amalgamated Sugar, sued to enjoin
NL Industries' poison pill.44 The NLI pill contained the standard redemption rights45
along with conversion rights that contained both flip-in and flip-over provisions. 46
33. Dawson, supra note 10, at 427.
34. SEC, supra note 5, at 88,044.
35. Id.
36. Dawson, supra note 10, at 428.
37. Amalgamated Sugar, 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
38. Dawson, supra note 10, at 428.
39. Id. at 428-29; SEC, supra note 5, at 88,045.
40. SEC, supra note 5, at 88,045.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. One author states that the uncertain legal status of more potent pills creates a "drafting nightmare." Oesterle,
supra note 11, at 133. The dilemma is as follows: "The more severe the [poison pill], the more likely a judge will act
to nullify [it] once triggered. But the less severe [the pill], the less likely a bidder will find them a hindrance to unapproved
takeovers." Id.
44. Amalgamated Sugar, 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). For subsequent developments in the
Amalgamated Sugar litigation, see Dawson, supra note 10, at 437.
45. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
46. Amalgamated Sugar, 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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Significantly, under the flip-in provision, all holders of conversion rights except the
acquiring person were entitled to buy shares in the surviving entity at a fifty percent
discount.47 If the flip-in provision were triggered, the voting rights and equity of the
acquiring person alone would be subject to dilution. 48 The court recognized that the
discriminatory dilution of a prospective acquirer would be so drastic that "no one in
his right mind [would] ever tender in the face of this plan." 49
Amalgamated Sugar challenged the flip-in provision on ultra vires grounds. It
argued that New Jersey's Business Corporations Act does not permit discrimination
among shareholders of the same class of stock; since the flip-in provision dilutes only
the acquirer's holdings, it creates an unauthorized disparity of treatment among
shareholders. The court agreed. Relying heavily on Asarco Inc. v. Court,50 Judge
Broderick found that while New Jersey Business Corporation Act § 14A:7-151
explicitly permits differences in voting rights between classes or series of stock, it
does not allow the issuance of stock with discriminatory voting rights within a class
or series.52 Therefore, NLI's discriminatory flip-in pill was void as ultra vires.5 3
The Court also rejected NLI's contention that the rule of Moran v. Household
International, Inc. 54 should apply.55 In Moran, the court declared that although
Delaware General Corporation Law does not explicitly grant the authority to enact a
takeover defense, its silence on the matter does not act as a bar.56 But since the Moran
pill contained only a nondiscriminatory flip-over pill, the Delaware Supreme Court
did not even consider whether it ran afoul of the state's nondiscrimination statute. 57
The Amalgamated Sugar court distinguished Moran on this ground, stating that the
pill challenged in Moran "did not contain a provision for voiding certain rights and
increasing others," while the NLI pill did.5 8
47. Id. at 1233.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1238.
50. 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985).
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-1 (-Vest 1969).
52. Amalgamated Sugar, 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
53. Id. at 1234.
54. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
55. Amalgamated Sugar, 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
56. 500 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1985).
57. Amalgamated Sugar, 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1237-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
58. Id. at 1237. It is noteworthy that the Moran opinion does not specifically mention whether the Household pill
contained discriminatory provisions. A flip-over pill does not rely on discriminatory dilution for its deterrent effect.
Instead, its effectiveness stems from its dilution effect, created by allowing common holders in the target to buy into the
acquirer at a 50% discount. Although the acquirer has the same right, it would only allow the acquirer to shift money from
one pocket to another.
Assuming that the Household pill contained a discriminatory provision, it is not clear whether the Delaware Supreme
Court would have rejected the ultra vires challenge. In this situation, the Moran court could have chosen between two
existing precedents. In Telvest Inc. v. Olson, No. 5798 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979) [available on WESTLAW, DE-CS
database], the Delaware Chancery Court stated that varied voting rights within the same class of stock are not authorized
by Delaware's Corporation laws.
A contravening rationale was developed in Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977). In
Baker, the Delaware Supreme Court held that varied voting rights within the same class was a valid exercise of corporate
authority. The Court reasoned that there was no express statutory prohibition against varied voting rights. The historical
bias of Delaware courts towards protecting the discretionary powers of corporate managers favors the adoption of Baker.
1988]
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IV. THE ULTRA ViNEs DOCTRINE APPLIED
Should all discriminatory poison pills be invalidated as ultra vires? Resolution of
this issue requires some focus on the history of the ultra vires doctrine and case law
developments subsequent to Amalgamated Sugar.
A. The Ultra Vires Doctrine: A Historical Perspective
The ultra vires59 doctrine was originally designed to protect shareholders against
capital risk created when a corporation strayed from its incipient purpose.60 An early
formulation of the doctrine states that corporations could not "be bound by any
contract executed by any of their officers or agents, which is entirely beyond the
scope of their powers, or entirely foreign to the purposes of their creation, or
absolutely immoral or against public policy; [and] that contracts thus made are
absolutely void .... "61 The doctrine was strictly limited to the avoidance of ultra
vires acts of corporations; it did not apply to the acts of corporate managers "which
were in excess of the authority given them in the management of the internal affairs
of the company.'"62
But the doctrine quickly became "a species of Frankenstein . constantly
cropping up in unexpected quarters, and manifesting its effects in an unforeseen and
unwelcome manner." ' 63 By the late 1800s, the term ultra vires was expanded
to express that the act of the directors or officers is in excess of their authority as agents of
the corporation, or that the act of the majority of the stockholders is in violation of the rights
of the minority, or that the act has not been done in conformity with the requirements of the
charter, or the act is one which the corporation itself has not the capacity to do, as being in
excess of the corporation['s statutory] powers.64
In part, the growth of the ultra vires doctrine was attributable to its attendant rule
of construction: "That [legislative] grants to private corporations shall be construed
strictly against the grantees; and to prevail they must be express and clear beyond a
doubt; a doubt defeats the power." 65 Thus, the common law rule of construction set
parameters on corporate activity by construing against the corporation any statute that
had more than one plausible construction. By nullifying any corporate act that was
outside the "plain words" or "necessary implication" of the powers conferred by
59. Literally, ultra vires means "beyond powers." BLACK's LAW DIC'iONARY 1365, 1408 (5th ed. 1979).
60. Schaeftler, Ultra Vires - Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires Acts ofBusiness Corporations,
9 J. CORP. LAw 81, 81 n. 1 (1983). In the 1700s and early 1800s, corporations could be formed only for limited purposes,
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS 478 (3d ed. 1983), usually for the creation of public works. Schaeftler,
supra this note, at 85.
61. G. FILD, ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 355 (2d ed. 1883). The principles underlying the ultra vires
doctrine were first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 127 (1804). The doctrine itself first appeared in 1845. W.S. BracE, A TREATsEON THE DoCrINE OF ULTRA VIREs,
extract (2d ed. 1893).
62. R.A. REESE, THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN THE LAw OF CoRPoRATioNs 26-27 (1897).
63. BRICE, supra note 61, at xix.
64. REESE, supra note 62, at 26; see also McDermott v. Bear Film Co., 219 Cal. App. 2d 607, 610, 33 Cal. Rptr.
486, 489 (1963) (Ultra vires is defined as "an action which is beyond the purpose or power of the corporation... [s]ome
courts have inflated the phrase to characterize acts which are within the corporate purpose or power but performed in an
unauthorized manner or without authority.").
65. See REESE, supra note 62, at 12.
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statute, 66 the ultra vires doctrine allowed shareholders to monitor their corporations
and provided corporations with a defense against unwanted contractual obligations.
In response to changes in the perception of late nineteenth century corporations 67
and the incongruous results produced by the expanding body of ultra vires case law, 68
legislators began to reform the doctrine. First, states limited application of the
doctrine to three types of actions: 1) suits by a shareholder against the corporation; 2)
suits by a corporation or shareholder derivative suits against the corporation's
management; and 3) suits by the state attorney general against the corporation. 69
These restrictions preclude "raising the ultra vires defense in actions between
corporations and third parties. ' 70 Thus, neither a corporation nor a party to a contract
with the corporation can avoid their respective contractual obligations on ultra vires
grounds. Moreover, the third party no longer has to inquire into limitations on the
corporation's powers before contracting with the corporation.7'
States' ratification of "any lawful purpose" clauses provided the second check
on the ultra vires doctrine. 72 In the heyday of the ultra vires doctrine, a corporation
66. Id. at 20.
67. Throughout the 1700s and 1800s, the corporation was viewed with "distrust and disfavor." Schaeftler, supra
note 60, at 88. Shareholders were generally small in number and kept well-informed of the corporation's activities.
Lipton, supra note 2, at 3. Toward the end of the 1800s, the corporate form was broadly accepted. Schaeffler, supra note
60, at 88-89. Shareholders became dispersed and profit-oriented, not growth-oriented. Lipton, supra note 2, at 4. Lured
by the promise of economic growth, an expanded tax base and income from incorporations, many states began to release
constraints on corporate activities in order to increase the number of local incorporations.
68. See generally Schaeftler, supra note 60, at 82 n.4 (listing commentators who criticized the "uncertain and
unjust consequences" of the ultra vires doctrine).
69. MODEL Busmrss CoRP. Acr § 3.04 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter MBCA]. MBCA § 3.04 reads:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the validity of corporate action may not be challenged on the ground
that the corporation lacks or lacked power to act.(b)A corporation's power to act may be challenged:(1) in a
proceeding by a shareholder against the corporation to enjoin the act;(2) in a proceeding by the corporation,
directly, derivatively, or through a receiver, trustee, or other legal representative, against an incumbent or
former director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation; or (3) in a proceeding by the Attorney General
under section 14.30.(c) In a shareholder's proceeding under subsection (b)(1) to enjoin an unauthorized
corporate act, the court may enjoin or set aside the act, if equitable and if all affected persons are parties to the
proceeding, and may award damages for loss (other than anticipated profits) suffered by the corporation or
another party because of enjoining the unauthorized act.
Every state except Hawaii has adopted an ultra vires provision. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-24 (1987); ALAsKA STAT. § 10.05.018
(1985); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-007 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-26-205 (1987); CAL. CORP. CODE § 209 (West 1977
& Supp. 1988); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 7-3-105 (1986); CONN. GN. STAT. ANN. § 33-292 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8. § 124 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-307 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607-021 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-22
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-7 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 3.15 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-10-4
(Bums 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.6 (Vest 1962); KA. STAT. ANN. § 17-610 (1981); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 271A.035; LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 12.42 (West 1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 203 (1981); MD. CoRPs. &
Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 1-403 (1985); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 10 (1979); MiCH. CoRP. LAws ANN. § 450.1271
(West 1973); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.165 (West 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-11 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351-395
(Vernon 1966); Mo,,r. CODE ANN. § 35-1-110 (1987); NEB. Rev. STAT. § 21-2006 (1983); NEv. Rev. STAT. § 78.135
(1986); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:7 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-2 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-6
(1987); N.Y. Bus. Cotu. LAw § 203 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-18 (1987); N.D. CEtr. CODE § 10-19-06
(1985); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(H) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1.18, 1.28,
1.29 (Vest 1986); OR. REv. STAT. § 57.040 (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1303 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-6
(1985); S.C. CODE § 33-3-30 (Law. Co-op 1987); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 47-2-60,47-2-63 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-1-405 (1984); T1x. Bus. CoR.P. AcT ANNi. art. 2.04 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-6 (1987); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 1854 (1984); VA. CODE § 13-1-630 (1985); WASH. Rev. CODE ANN. § 23A-08.040 (1969); W. VA. CODE
§ 31-1-10 (1988); Visc. STAT. ANN. § 180.06 (West 1957); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-106 (1987).
70. Schaeftler, supra note 60, at 83.
71. MBCA, supra note 69, at § 3.04, official comment.
72. HENN & ALExAsEo, supra note 60, at 478.
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could only be incorporated for a limited purpose.73 For instance, a corporation
authorized to build a railroad could not construct a harbor.74 But in the late 1800s,
state corporation laws allowed entities to incorporate for "any lawful purpose." 75
Currently, every state has on record an "any lawful purpose" provision. 76
The effect of the corporate reform movement was to effectively eliminate the
ultra vires doctrine. 77 The official comments to the Model Business Corporation Act
suggest that the purpose of the new ultra vires legislation "is to eliminate all vestiges
of the doctrine of inherent incapacity of corporations. "78 This statement suggests that
the new legislation creates a presumption that a particular corporate act is authorized
by law; the presumption can only be rebutted by showing that a statute specifically
outlaws a particular activity. However, the existing ultra vires legislation still permits
a shareholder to challenge any corporate action as being ultra vires. 79
Presumably, the demanding common law rule of construction in ultra vires
cases-that a doubt defeats the power 8O-applies in these shareholder suits since it has
not been altered by statute. Clearly, the application of the stringent common law rule
of construction should be limited in scope in order to avoid regeneration of the
incongruous results produced by earlier ultra vires cases. However, this rule of
construction is properly applied in the context of corporate takeovers 8' because, as
Judge Posner stated in reference to the business judgment rule in Dynamics Corp. of
America v. CTS Corp., "there is a potential conflict of interest between the managers
and shareholders." 82 Furthermore, the ultra vires doctrine, unlike the business judg-
ment rule, is designed to protect shareholder interests; therefore, the common law rule
of construction is even better suited to the ultra vires doctrine in the takeover setting.
Using the strict rule of construction, a shareholder's challenge to the board's adoption
of an antitakeover device which creates a potential conflict of interest should be upheld
if the plain words or necessary implication of the state's business corporation law does
not clearly support the board's authority to so act.
This rule finds some support in the "cardinal rule" of statutory interpretation
that a statute with more than one conceivable construction should be interpreted to
avoid determination of its constitutionality. 83 Through this rule, the judiciary
73. Id.
74. BrFucE, supra note 61, at 45.
75. Lipton, supra note 2, at 3; Schaeftler, supra note 60, at 89.
76. Schaeffler, supra note 60, at 89 n.32.
77. Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, 11 Bus. LAW 98, 102 (1956).
78. MBCA, supra note 69, at § 3.04, official comment.
79. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
81. This Comment does not address the application of the strict rule of construction beyond situations where a
statute has two plausible interpretations, one of which creates a potential conflict of interest between managers and
shareholders.
82. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S.
69 (1987). Ironically, Judge Posner dismissed the ultra vires argument as presented in Dynamics. Id. at 718. Posner, as
a founder of the law and economics approach to jurisprudence is predisposed to striking down antitakeover devices as
impediments to the free trade of shares. See R. PosNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS oF LAw 386-88 (3d ed. 1986). He may not
have availed himself of the ultra vires argument in order to focus his analysis on the business judgment or because to do
so would require a broad interpretation of Illinois' antidiscrimination statute, a position that is inconsistent with his view
on judicial restraint. Id. at 584.
83. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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"imposes on legislatures a duty to express clearly their intent to challenge the
constitutional line." '84 While the rule is designed to avoid testing of constitutional
issues, its policy of forcing the legislature to "face the music" should be applied in
the takeover context when a potential conflict of interest exists and the state's
corporate laws do not specifically authorize board action in the face of the conflict.
In addition, as applied in Amalgamated Sugar, the strict rule of construction results
in a broad interpretation of state antidiscrimination laws to enhance shareholder
protection and force legislators to carve out specific exceptions to the policy of
shareholder protection and equality among shares.
B. Down the Road From Amalgamated Sugar
Amalgamated Sugar signals the reincarnation of the ultra vires doctrine as a
threshold consideration in determining the legality of a poison pill. 85 The ultra vires
challenge not only precedes analysis under the business judgment rule, but overshad-
ows that analysis to the extent that it has effectively invalidated all discriminatory
pills in New Jersey. Subsequent decisions under Hawaii86 and Wisconsin87 law have
adopted the rationale of Amalgamated Sugar. Moreover, the argument is available to
every jurisdiction insofar as each has an antidiscrimination statute. 88
84. Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 YALE L.J. 1185, 1205 n.77 (1986).
85. Moran, 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1257
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
86. Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp., [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,058 (D.
Haw. Oct. 31, 1986), vacated, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,157 (D. Haw. Jan. 30, 1987)
(preliminary injunction vacated based in part on stipulations of parties).
87. R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (temporary restraining order denied
because no immediate threat of irreparable injury; however, court found that discriminatory poison pill would likely be
struck down as ultra vires).
88. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-32 (1987); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 10.05.060, 10.05.063 (1985); Am. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10-015, 10-018 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-601 (1987); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 400, 402, 403 (West 1977 & Supp.
1988); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-4-101 (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-324, 33-340 (vest 1987); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 151 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-313 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.044 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-80,
14-2-93 (1982); HAwAn REv. STAT. § 415-15 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE 30-1-15 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 6.05 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-25-1 (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1987); IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.14 (West
1962 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-6401, 17-6603 (1981 & Supp. 1987); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.075
(1981); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:51, 12:55, 12:56 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, §§ 501,
519 (1981 & Supp. 1987); Mo. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 2-105, 2-201 (1985 & Supp. 1988); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 156B, § 13(a)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); MiCH. Cosu. LAws ANN. §9 450.1301,450.1302-1304,450.1362,
450.1363 (West 1973); MmNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.401 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-27 (1973);
Mo. Am. STAT. § 351.180 (Vernon 1966 &Supp. 1988); MoNr. CODEANN. § 35-1-601 (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2014
(1983); NEv. REv. STAT. H 78-195, 78-307 (1986 & Supp. 1987); N.H. R v. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:15 (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 99 14A:7-1, 14A:7-6, 14A:7-9 (West 1969 & Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-15 (1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAw 9§ 501, 512, 519 (MeKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-40, 55-42 (1987); N.D. Corr. CODE
§ 10-19.1-61 (1985); Owo REv. CODE ANm. § 1701.06, 1707.22, 1701.23 (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1.73-1.75, 1.137 (West 1986); OR. REv. STAT. § 57.080 (1984); PA. STAT. Arm. tit. 15, § 1601 (Purdon 1967 & Supp.
1987); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-14 (1985); S.C. CODE §§ 33-9-10,33-9-190,33-9-200,33-9-250 (Law. Co-op 1987); S.D.
Co.mt. Lws ANN. §§ 47-3-1-47-3-3 (1987); TurN. CODE ANN. § 48-6-101 (1984); see TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art.
2.12 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE Am. § 16-10-14 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 1 1862 (1984); VA. CODE
§ 13.1-638 (1985); WAsH. REv. CODE Am. § 23A.08.120 (1969 & Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-78 (1988); WvIs.
STAT. ANN. § 180.12 (West 1957 & Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 17-112 (1987).
These statutes vary significantly in content. For example, MBCA § 6.01 reads in relevant part:
(a) The articles of incorporation must prescribe the classes of shares and the number of shares of each class that
the corporation is authorized to issue. If more than one class of shares is authorized, the articles of incorporation
must prescribe a distinguishing designation for each class, and, prior to the issuance of shares of a class, the
preferences, limitations, and relative rights of that class must be described in the articles of incorporation. All
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Despite the doctrine's revival in some quarters, other courts and commentators
decry its application to discriminatory pills. Besides Moran, which was decided
under Delaware law, decisions under Indiana, 89 Michigan, 9° Minnesota, 91 and
Louisiana 92 law do not support the argument that discriminatory pills are ultra vires.
For instance, in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., the Seventh Circuit held
that discriminatory pills comply with Indiana's antidiscrimination statute, which
requires identical rights within a share class, because discriminatory pills only
discriminate among shareholders, not among shares. 93
However, Dynamics rejection of the ultra vires argument rests purely on
semantic grounds. The court does not construe Indiana's antidiscrimination statute in
a way that advances its goal of shareholder protection and equality among shares. Its
decision is inconsistent with the proper use of the common law rule of construction
in ultra vires cases. Nor does the court recognize that an entity's "shareholderness"
emanates from its ownership of shares. In other words, the court ignores the reality
that a corporation cannot discriminate between shareholders without debilitating the
rights of the shareholder's shares in relation to other shares within the same class.
Dynamics effectively supports the proposition that corporations have the inherent
capacity to act in contravention to an established rule of shareholder protection: the
rule against discrimination among shares. In sum, the Seventh Circuit should have
given greater consideration to the acquiror's ultra vires argument.
Professor Oesterle presents another criticism of the ultra vires argument. 94 He
argues that state antidiscrimination statutes were only "intended to protect existing
shareholders from a dilution of their equity position by unilateral broad action taken
place after the shareholder has invested." ' 95 The flip-in pill, by contrast, discrimi-
nates only against purchasers of shares subsequent to the issuance of the rights
dividend. These parties knew that their conversion rights would be invalidated if they
triggered the rights. 96 Professor Oesterle explains that the subsequent purchasers were
shares of a class must have preferences, limitations, and relative rights identical with those of other shares of
the same class except to the extent otherwise permitted by section 6.02.(b) The articles of incorporation must
authorize (1) one or more classes of shares that together have unlimited voting rights, and (2) one or more
classes of shares (which may be the same class or classes as those with voting rights) that together are entitled
to receive the net assets of the corporation upon dissolution. (emphasis added).
MBCA § 6.01 expressly requires identical rights across shares.
By contrast, New Jersey's antidiscrimination law arises from judicial interpretation of general share issuance
provisions in that state's corporation law. See Asarco, Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985).
89. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 718 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S.
69 (1987).
90. Harvard Indus. v. Tyson, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,064, 95,294 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 25, 1986).
91. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 847-48 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part and vacated
in part on other grounds, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987).
92. Groves v. Rosemound Improvement Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 925 (La. App. 1982).
93. 805 F.2d 705, 718 (7th Cir. 1986).
94. Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CoRNE.L L.
REv. 117 (1986)..
95. Id. at 132 n.58 (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
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effectively disadvantaged by dilution before they had purchased their stock.97 He
asserts that "if one asks whether the plans discriminated among shareholders at the
time [the rights dividend was issued], the technical answer would be no; the bidder's
act created the discrimination.' 98
Professor Oesterle's criticism is also defective. It, too, ignores the stringent rule
of construction applicable in ultra vires cases, even though Professor Oesterle
recognizes the importance of higher scrutiny where a poison pill absolutely deters
takeover. 99 Instead, he generously interprets the antidiscrimination statutes to contain
a notice-waiver feature: if a shareholder purchases stock after issuance of a rights
dividend, the shareholder waives the protection of the antidiscrimination statute by
triggering the rights. This interpretation is akin to a presumption that the target board
is legislatively authorized to adopt a discriminatory pill. In fact, it significantly
narrows the protection offered by the antidiscrimination statute.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the laws of some states, the ultra vires doctrine provides a limited
constraint on corporate authority. For example, Amalgamated Sugar determined that
New Jersey's antidiscrimination statute withheld from corporations the power to
adopt discriminatory pills. In considering antitakeover devices, where a potential
conflict of interest exists between shareholders and managers, an enabling statute
capable of two interpretations is properly construed against management rather than
the shareholders. This rule is consistent with the common law rule of judicial
construction that ambiguity in an enabling statute is to be construed against the
corporation. It also adds objectivity and consistency to judicial decisionmaking, and
properly errs on the side of shareholder protection. Finally, the practical result in
Amalgamated Sugar was in accord with the policy of shareholder protection
manifested in state antidiscrimination statutes and it strips corporate managers of the





99. Id. at 155. Amalgamated Sugar states that the flip-in pill absolutely deters takeover. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
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